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A
mAbstract
The Current Population Survey is used to investigate effects of Common Law Marriage
(CLM) on whether young US-born adults live in couples in the US CLM effects are
identified through cross-state and time variation, as some states repealed CLM over
the period examined. Analysis based on Gary Becker’s marriage economics helps
explain why CLM affects couple formation and does so differently depending on
education, sex ratios, age, and parent status. CLM reduces in-couple residence, and
more so for childless adults and where there are fewer men per woman. Effects are
larger for college-educated men and women without college. CLM effects on likelihood
of marriage and cohabitation and likelihood of being divorced if ever-married are
also estimated.
JEL: J10; J12; J16
Keywords: Common-law marriage; Couple; Couple formation; Marriage; Cohabitation;
Gary Becker1 Introduction
The last few decades have witnessed a movement from marriage towards unmarried
cohabitation. For example, 48% of over 12,000 women interviewed in 2006–2010 for
the National Survey of Family Growth cohabited with a partner at a first union, com-
pared with 34% of women in 1995.1 About 41% of all children in this country are born
to unmarried mothers, including a quarter of all births to mothers who cohabit with
their partner (National Vital Statistics Reports 2014). In our sample, couple formation
rates have decreased during this period: in 1995, 43% of men ages 18 to 35 and 50% of
women the same age resided in couple; by 2011, these percentages had dropped to
37% and 44%.
There are many benefits of living in a couple rather than alone: larger households
enjoy economies of scale in expenses; partners can specialize in various tasks which
leads to higher productivity of both partners; household tasks require no transaction
costs, partners can enjoy joint consumption; and one partner’s income can serve as in-
surance against the other partner’s income shocks. However the main reason why cou-
ples are formed is to provide a protective environment for children. Children born to
parents living in a couple are better off than children of single parents, in part because
they grow up with more of a father’s presence in their lives (see Mincy and Oliver
2003). Relative to children raised by a mother and a father, children raised by a single
parent often achieve less in terms of school performance (McLanahan and Sandefur
1994, McLanahan and Sigle-Rushton 2004) and have higher rates of depression and2014 Grossbard and Vernon; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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dividuals form couples or not has an impact on the demand for goods and services
such as housing and childcare.
The choice between marriage and (non-marital) cohabitation [hence simply called
‘cohabitation’] is a more subtle one. The two institutions differ, e.g., in their tax implica-
tions, access to a spouse’s Social Security and other government benefits, and access to
employer benefits such as health insurance and pension plans. Consequently, marriage
provides more asset protection to the spouse who earned less (possibly because they
engaged more in household production) in the event of dissolution due to separation
or death.
In this paper, we examine whether the likelihood of in-couple residence, marriage, co-
habitation, and likelihood of being divorced among those ever-married are associated
with variation in the state-level availability of Common Law Marriage (CLM). Several
US states offer their heterosexual residents this additional way of organizing their
living-together arrangements. CLM does not require a marriage certificate or cere-
mony, it can be established when couples cohabit and hold themselves out as spouses
by calling each other husband and wife in public, using the same last name, filing joint
tax returns, or declaring their marriage on applications, leases, birth certificates and
other documents. Cohabiting couples who have a child are almost certainly considered
“married” in a CLM state. In the event of separation, such couples go through a regular
divorce. Once established, CLM is no different from marriage, including its acceptance
by all other states and government institutions dealing with tax collection and redistri-
bution of income.
In most states with CLM, there are no rules regarding cohabitation time required for
common law marriage. A short term cohabiting relationship may also be called “marriage”
if both spouses agree. One peculiar feature of CLM that distinguishes it from a regular
marriage is that it can be claimed ex-post by one partner after the relationship ends
due to separation or death. This fluid definition of marriage in CLM states is one of
the reasons why this paper’s focus is on in-couple co-residence—married or not–more
than on marriage and cohabitation as two separate states.
Most US states recognized CLM in the past but don’t any more. The historical vagar-
ies of why some states have the law and others don’t are described in Bowman (1996)
and Lind (2008). Informal marriage was originally brought to the colonies by British
settlers, and it remained in the U.S. long after its repeal in the U.K. in 1753. Among
the factors that explain early popularity of these laws in the US are the philosophy of
non-interference of the state in its citizens’ private affairs and the practical advantages
of establishing marriages in frontier conditions when priests were not available. A first
wave of repeals of CLM laws occurred between 1875 and 1917; a second wave in the
years 1921 to 1959. These repeals have been explained, e.g., in terms of transportation
improvements (it became easier to register marriages), the expanded system of govern-
ment benefits with spousal entitlements (making it more costly for states to recognize
CLM), and growth in the number of contested marriage cases (Bowman 1996).
As of 2014, common-law marriage remains legal in: Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas,
Montana, New Hampshire (only posthumously for purposes of inheritance), Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, as well as in the Navajo Nation and in the District of
Columbia. CLM laws are also found in Utah where they were repealed in 1888 and
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Georgia (1997), and Pennsylvania (2005), thus providing us with a quasi-experiment. The
internet contains plenty of information and legal advice for couples about CLM, so we know
it is practiced.2 Some indication of CLM’s prevalence can be derived from the fact that
about one hundred legal CLM–related judgments have been issued each decade in each
state with CLM laws at the federal level, according to legal historian Goran Lind (2008).
Data availability on CLM is a problem. There is virtually no official data on CLM
marriages published by state or local governments, even though some counties encour-
age residents to register their CLMs.3 We circumvent this data problem by exploiting
cross-state variation in CLM and changes over time.
Our analysis includes the derivation of predictions regarding the effect of CLM on
couple formation based on Gary Becker’s (1973) demand and supply model of
marriage.4 Becker’s pioneering economic theory of marriage is part of his economic ap-
proach to the family, one of his contributions highlighted by the Nobel prize commit-
tee. Our model leads us to predict that CLM will be associated with lower couple
formation rates and that the extent of CLM’s effect will depend on male and female
education, sex ratios, parental status, and age. The model assumes traditional gender
roles, with women more involved in home production than men, and helps explain
gender differences in the effects of CLM on subgroups of the population.
Previous research has linked variation in legal regimes to outcomes related to couple for-
mation, dissolution, and fertility. The focus of much of that U.S.-based research has been
on the effect of no-fault or unilateral divorce on divorce rates (e.g. Peters 1986, Friedberg
1998, and Wolfers 2006), marriage rates (e.g. Alesina A and Guiliano P 2007, Divorce, Fer-
tility and the Value of Marriage, Harvard Institue of Economics Research Discussion Paper
No 2136, April, unpublished manuscript, Rasul 2006), and couples’ investments in
marriage-specific capital such as spouse’s education and children (Stevenson 2007). Halla
(2013) showed that the introduction of joint custody increased marriage rates, overall fertil-
ity (including a shift from non-marital to marital fertility), and divorce rates for older cou-
ples. Leturcq (2011) has studied how the introduction of PACS (civil unions) in France in
1999 has affected marriage, and Guttierez and Becerra (2012) studied its effect on fertility.
Variations in laws regulating division of property in the case of dissolution have helped ex-
plain the likelihood that women are out-of-couple when they give birth (Ekert-Jaffe and
Grossbard 2008). However, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study examining
the effect of CLM laws on couple formation. Elsewhere (Grossbard S, Vernon V (forthcom-
ing) Common law marriage, labor supply and time use: a partial explanation for gender
convergence in labor supply. Res Labor Econ), we analyzed effects of CLM on labor supply.
We include sex ratios in all our models explaining in-couple residence, marriage, co-
habitation, and likelihood of being divorced if ever-married. This variable was included
in Becker’s (1973) Demand and Supply models of marriage and in earlier empirical re-
search on couple formation (e.g. by Heer and Grossbard-Shechtman 1981, Lichter et al.
1992, and Angrist 2002). Higher sex ratios tend to be associated with higher marriage
rates relative to single status and relative to cohabitation (Grossbard-Shechtman 1993).
Our models assume that state laws regarding CLM and changes in those laws are
known to state residents. The wealth of information online supports this assumption.
We use individual-level data for US-born men and women ages 18-35 based on the
Current Population Surveys (CPS) for the period 1995-2011, focusing on US-born
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this law, possibly based on the experience of older community members. We exclude
foreign-born respondents who may have been unaware of CLM laws when they decided
to form a couple. In some of our models, we assume that such legal knowledge is trans-
mitted immediately. In other models, we relax that assumption and either exclude three
years of data after the repeal of CLM in each of the relevant states or control for years
before and after the repeal. We limit our analyses to respondents under age 36, as they
are most likely to be entering marriage.5 We also assume that inter-state migration is
minimal, and that if people move, they don’t do so based on whether a state has CLM
or not.
Consistent with our predictions, we find that CLM is associated with lower rates of
in-couple residence, especially when sex ratios are low. We also find similar CLM
effects on marriage probabilities when sex ratios are low. CLM’s negative effect on
in-couple residence is seen for less educated men and women mainly because of its
negative effect on cohabitation. Another finding consistent with our model’s prediction
is that CLM only has a negative effect on in-couple residence of men with a college
education, and not on their female counterparts. This effect is found separately for the
likelihood of marriage and that of cohabitation. We also find that CLM has a larger
negative effect on in-couple residence of women with no college education than on that
of women who are college-educated. Childless men and women are more likely to re-
spond to changes in CLM. Our demand and supply model of marriage helps explain
these findings.
2 Why would CLM affect couple formation?
The following predictions are based on a demand and supply model of marriage
inspired by Becker (1973) and on the concept of Work-In-Household (WiHo), defined
as household production work of benefit to a spouse/partner. WiHo may include activ-
ities such as parenting, meal preparation, and house cleaning (see Grossbard-
Shechtman 1984).6 In a couple, individuals may sometimes exchange WiHo, but if one
partner works relatively more in WiHo, that partner is the WiHo-worker. The WiHo-
worker may not necessarily be working at WiHo full time: she or he may also be
employed in the labor force. The other spouse may ‘pay’ the WiHo-worker in the form
of an intra-couple transfer of money or goods.7 A higher price for WiHo means that
the individual WiHo-worker obtains a larger transfer for the same amount of WiHo8.
Marriage markets are viewed as markets for WiHo, in part to facilitate reliance on
labor market analysis.9 An example of such a WiHo market is shown in Figure 1. h
denotes WiHo; y denotes its price. When traditional gender roles and heterosexuality
prevail, women tend to be the WiHo-workers. Women’s willingness to form a couple is
expressed as a supply of WiHo, i.e., a willingness to supply different amounts of WiHo
at different ‘prices’.10 Women’s supply is upward-sloping: higher pay gives incentives to
work more at such household production. With traditional gender roles, those benefit-
ing from WiHo and possibly ‘paying’ for it are men. Men thus have a demand for
WiHo, reflecting their willingness to pay for different amounts of women’s WiHo. The
demand is downward-sloping: the more expensive WiHo, the more men will look for
substitute ways of fulfilling their needs for clean clothing, meals, etc. Men will prefer to
pay less for women’s WiHo; women will prefer to earn more for that kind of work.
Figure 1 Market for women’s work-in-household, comparing CLM states to non-CLM states.
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Equilibrium prices for WiHo are established at the intersection of aggregate demand
and supply in markets for WiHo. In each market, women are sufficiently alike to be
substitutable and the same is true for the men in that market. There are many interre-
lated WiHo markets defined by personal characteristics of men and women (such as
education and age).
The price for WiHo when a couple cohabits (Work-in-a-cohabiting-household or
cohabitation-WiHo) may be lower than that for WiHo supplied in marriage. This may
be reflected, e.g., in the form of fewer benefits for WiHo-workers in case of death or di-
vorce (Mincy et al. 2005). To the extent that a CLM law imposes the higher price for
WiHo that prevails among married couples on cohabiting couples, it can be viewed as
the equivalent of a minimum wage law. Interpreting the WiHo in Figure 1 as
cohabitation-WiHo and assuming traditional gender roles, CLM laws set a minimum
price of WiHo, i.e. ymin. In Figure 1, that minimum price lies above the market-
clearing y. At this higher y, women are willing to work more at WiHo: they move up
their supply. However, at the higher ymin, men are less willing to obtain WiHo than
they were at the market-clearing price. The law prevents men from ‘hiring’ women
doing WiHo work for them in return for a cohabitation contract with low legal protec-
tion. It has to be marriage whenever WiHo workers want it. The higher price of
women’s WiHo implies both a price effect and an income effect, leading men to move
up their demand curve.
At the new equilibrium associated with CLM and ymin, the total amount of WiHo
supplied will be the amount demanded and will be less than the amount of WiHo sup-
plied in market equilibrium without CLM to the extent that the demand is downward-
sloping and the supply is upward-sloping. By definition, less total employment in
WiHo corresponds to a smaller number of cohabiting couples. The number of married
couples is not expected to grow as a result of CLM; thus,
Prediction 1. Under CLM, there will be a lower probability that individuals live in
couples.
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and women are likely to be similar. However, in submarkets of men and women with
particular characteristics, CLM may have different effects on the status of specific types
of men and women. It is assumed that gender roles are traditional, and women get paid
for their WiHo. Expected sensitivity to CLM laws will depend on how effective the
ymin is relative to the market price of WiHo in a particular market. CLM laws are ex-
pected to have little impact if the market value of women’s WiHo in equilibrium is
already high (in such case the minimum y is not likely to be effective). A minimum
ymin is more likely to be effective and therefore to cause a drop in couple formation
where market-clearing WiHo prices y are relatively low.
Educated women interested in being (part-time or full-time) WiHo workers are likely
to be more in demand in marriage markets than their counterparts without a college
education. This higher demand is also reflected in higher marriage rates: for example,
in 2012, only 73% of 35- to 39-year-old adults without a bachelor’s degree had ever
married, but 81% of their college-educated counterparts had (Fry 2014; this education
gap also holds for women separately).11 Higher demand for educated WiHo workers is
also expected to raise the unobserved price of WiHo relative to that of spouses with
low education. Therefore, to the extent that women do more WiHo than men, when a
minimum price of y is imposed, it is expected to be more effective in markets for the
WiHo of women with low education relative to markets for women with higher educa-
tion whose y may already be above the ymin. Therefore, a minimum y due to CLM is
likely to affect WiHo workers with low education more, and:
Prediction 2. Drops in couple formation associated with CLM are likely to be larger
for women without a college education than for women who are college-educated.
If gender roles are traditional and men are paying for WiHo, and if they are more ed-
ucated and their income is higher, they may find that by levying more potential claims
on their future earnings, CLM entails higher costs: they may have to share a higher in-
come in case of separation, for example, if CLM is available in their state, but not if
they were cohabiting in a non-CLM state. Therefore, CLM entails more of a movement
along men’s demand curve for WiHo if men are college-educated than if they are not.
Therefore,
Prediction 3. Drops in couple formation associated with CLM are likely to be larger
for men with a college education than for men without that education.
Assuming traditional gender roles, it thus follows that the combined effect of CLM
and education will differ for men and women. More generally, Predictions 2 and 3 re-
garding education depend on whether men and women are predominantly WiHo
workers or employers of WiHo. The more they are likely to be on the employer side,
the more the combined effect of education and CLM on couple formation is likely to
be negative. The more they are likely to be WiHo workers, the less CLM is likely to
affect couple formation of the college-educated.
Gender asymmetry in the predicted effect of CLM is related to possible gender differ-
ences in preferences for relationships with partners with a similar education. We postu-
late that given traditional gender roles, men tend to be on demand side and women on
the supply side in WiHo markets. CLM effects are related to the likelihood that men
pay women for their WiHo. Matches involving two college educated spouses who both
participate full-time in the labor force are not expected to entail much of a payment
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effect of CLM on couple formation is more likely to be observed for couples trading
WiHo in return for money or goods, which involves a monetary or quasi-monetary
price y. This is more likely to occur when men are more educated and earn more than
their spouse than when both have similar earnings.
Another group of women who are likely to obtain low market prices for their WiHo
are women living in areas with low sex ratios. Low sex ratios mean that there are rela-
tively few men for every woman wanting to marry, implying a relatively low demand
for WiHo. Consequently, the price of women’s WiHo is expected to be lower than
when sex ratios are high. In cultures where brideprice and/or dowry are observed and
varying with demand and supply, a lower sex ratio may involve a shift from brideprice
(men pay) to dowry (women pay). In that vein, Francis (2011) found that when sex ra-
tios dropped in Taiwan, brideprices became less common and dowries became more
common. In the US, we only have implicit WiHo prices, but nevertheless, a minimum
price for women’s WiHo, ymin, is expected to have a more negative effect on couple
formation prospects of women in markets with low sex ratios and therefore low price y
relative to its effect on women in markets with high sex ratios and high y.
Prediction 4. Drops in women’s couple formation associated with CLM are likely to
be larger in low sex ratio areas than in high sex ratio areas.
The next distinction we make is between parents and childless adults. It is expected
that relative to childless respondents, parents will do more WiHo work and are likely
to get paid more for their WiHo by their partner or spouse. Given that their market-
clearing y is likely to be high (even under cohabitation), women with children may not
be affected by a minimum ‘price’ ymin implied by CLM. Therefore, a minimum y tak-
ing the form of CLM laws is likely to be more effective for childless women supplying
WiHo to men than to women who share children with a man. It follows that
Prediction 5. CLM is more likely to be associated with a lower likelihood of being in
couple in the case of childless respondents than in the case of parents whose children
are present.
A final distinction is between respondents who are relatively younger and those who
are older. Here we set the dividing line at 25 and distinguish those 18 to 25 and those
26 to 35. It is expected that CLM will have more effect on women who can expect a
lower y in their markets for WiHo and who are therefore more likely to find that ymin
is an effective minimum price. This could possibly apply more to women ages 18 to 25
than to women ages 26 to 35. As for CLM’s effect on men of different ages, it will de-
pend on age differences in men’s demand for WiHo. Young men may be particularly
sensitive to an increased price of cohabitation WiHo. It follows that
Prediction 6. CLM is more likely to be associated with a lower likelihood of being in
couple in the case of the youngest respondents than in the case of those somewhat older.
This may be gender-specific.
The variables that we selected to formulate these predictions may also affect other re-
lated outcomes, such as the likelihood that an individual is married if he/she resides in
couple, cohabits if single, or is ever divorced at the time of the survey. CLM and some
of these variables also help explain labor supply: the women who do have a ‘WiHo
job’—and therefore are observed to be in couple–are expected to get paid more for
their WiHo if CLM is available than if it is not. Consequently, they will have a higher
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prediction for a number of labor supply measures is reported in Grossbard and Vernon
(forthcoming).
It also follows from this analysis that to the extent that in the US blacks and whites
participate in separate WiHo markets in the case marriage and cohabitation, we could
expect some differences in the effect of CLM on blacks and whites. However, we don’t
have a sufficient number of black respondents to test for such differential effects
of CLM.3 Data and sample means
We analyze micro data from the March Current Population Surveys12 (CPS) for the
period 1995-2011 to estimate individual probabilities of being in couple, being mar-
ried, and cohabitation. This is a large nationally representative dataset with informa-
tion on demographic characteristics, labor market status, and identifiable cohabiting
relationships. A drawback of the CPS is that not all cohabiting couples can be iden-
tified prior to 2007: until that date only relationships between household heads and
their partners were recorded, while other household members were assigned either
married or single status. Therefore, our sample will underestimate the share of co-
habiting couples in the population for 1995-2006. This should not be a problem be-
cause our variable of interest is not the time trend but the difference between CLM
and non-CLM states, as long as the designation of a household head and the com-
position of other family members do not vary systematically by CLM status. CPS
surveys prior to 1995 do not distinguish between partners and roommates; hence,
we draw data starting in 1995.
Three states repealed CLM over the period covered by this data set: Idaho (1996),
Georgia (1997), and Pennsylvania (2005). Had we been able to use earlier CPS data, we
could also have examined the effect of repealing CLM in Florida (1968) and Ohio
(1991).
We select all US-born men and women for we want to exclude individuals who
possibly made their marriage decision in another country. Excluding non-US citizens
resulted in a disproportionate loss of married individuals since first generation immi-
grants are more likely to be married and less likely to cohabit compared to the rest of
the US population. This selection affected the Hispanic sample the most: it shrank by
more than one-third.
We choose to focus on young individuals aged 18 to 35. Younger people are more
likely to be affected by the change in the marriage law as they are more likely to transi-
tion in and out of marriage and cohabitation. We also drop same-sex cohabiting cou-
ples. Our sample includes 321,917 women and 292,376 men, of which around 21.6%
live in CLM states. Sample means are presented in Table 1. It can be seen that CLM
states have a higher proportion of married and a lower proportion of cohabiting resi-
dents. Respondents from CLM states are on average less educated, less likely to be en-
rolled in college, and are more likely to have children and be Hispanic. CLM states
have lower unemployment rates, lower median household income, less generous wel-
fare payments and slightly lower sex ratios. All differences by CLM status are statisti-
cally significant at 5% due to large samples.
Table 1 Sample means
Women Men
CLM 21.6% CLM 21.4%
Non-CLM CLM Non-CLM CLM
Individual characteristics
Married 0.380 0.427 0.317 0.362
Cohabiting 0.087 0.073 0.080 0.069
Age 26.4 26.5 26.4 26.5
No high school diploma 0.115 0.128 0.138 0.151
Some college 0.366 0.358 0.329 0.326
College degree 0.183 0.175 0.158 0.151
Graduate degree 0.052 0.041 0.040 0.038
Black 0.159 0.151 0.137 0.131
Hispanic 0.082 0.132 0.085 0.133
Asian 0.019 0.007 0.020 0.008
Other race 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012
Presence of children <6 0.288 0.315 0.182 0.211
Children 6-17 0.149 0.167 0.069 0.080
Number of children 0.833 0.935 0.464 0.556
Metro: central city 0.267 0.266 0.259 0.260
Metro: outside central 0.557 0.525 0.565 0.525
Unearned income 53,331 49,324 49,601 43,524
State characteristics
Sex ratio 0.997 0.994 0.998 0.995
College educated adults 25.7 24.5 25.8 24.6
Unemployment rate 5.9 5.4 6.0 5.4
Median household income 51,957 49,083 52,046 49,216
Welfare 707 611 710 614
N 243,926 78,063 222,034 70,427
CPS 1995-2011. US born women and men, ages 18-35.
Notes. All differences are statistically significant. Means are weighted using survey weights.
Median household income is in Table H-8 at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/.
Unemployment rates are annual averages by state and are obtained from BLS (http://www.bls.gov/data/).
Sex ratios are calculated from Census state population estimates by dividing the number of men in each 5-year age
group by the number of women who are 2 years younger. For example, in order to get a sex ratio for women aged 18-22, we
divide the number of men aged 20-24 by the number of women aged 18-22. Sex ratios are calculated separately for white
and black population and for the total population. Other races as assigned sex ratios for total population. Population data by
age are obtained from http://www.census.gov/popest/data/intercensal/state/state2010.html and https://www.census.gov/
popest/data/state/asrh/2012/SC-EST2012-ALLDATA6.html.
Welfare benefits are maximum TANF + SNAP benefits for a family of two, in 2010 dollars, and are obtained from the
University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research http://www.ukcpr.org/data.
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dence (either marriage or cohabitation), extending beyond our sample’s age to age 44.
Relative to non-CLM states, for all age groups, there is a higher share of married and
lower share of cohabiting women in CLM states. Cohabitation rises from 3% at age 18,
to about 12% at age 24, and then declines back to 4% by age 44. The marriage profile is
much steeper: starting at 3% at age 18, one third of women by age 24, and covering
over 60% by age 32. After age 32, the marriage profile flattens and only grows by 7%
percentage points between ages 32 and 44. The age-marriage and age-cohabitation pro-
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Figure 2 (See legend on next page.)
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(See figure on previous page.)
Figure 2 Cohabitation and marriage profile by age and presence of CLM; all US-born women aged
18-44 in CPS 1995-2011. Results in Panel a are obtained from the full sample. Results in Panel b are
obtained by restricting the corresponding subsamples to respondents from three transition states. Models
in Panel a and Panel b are otherwise identical; other controls are shown at the bottom of the table.
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likely to be in couple than in non-CLM states until around age 32. After that, there is
no visible CLM differential in in-couple residence.
Between 1995 and 2011 the percentage of women ages 18-35 residing in couples de-
creased in all three states that repealed CLM; the percentage of men in couples decreased
in Georgia and (very slightly) in Pennsylvania. It grew slightly in Idaho (from 48% to 50%).
Figure 3 presents shares of women and men who reside in couples. That share decreased
slightly over time in non-CLM states for men and women. CLM states have higher shares
of men and women who live in couples. We notice above-average rates for Idaho and
below-average rates for Pennsylvania, which underscores the importance of including state
fixed effects or state-specific trends into our estimations. The graphs suggest that couple
formation may have increased in Idaho and decreased slightly in Georgia and Pennsylva-
nia after the repeal of CLM.
Figure 4 shows that relative to Hispanic and black women, white women are more likely
to be in couple. In non-CLM states, the in-couple residence rate for black women stands at
25%, amounting to less than half the rate for white women. Hispanic in-couple residence






























































































































Figure 4 Share of women in couple by race, CPS.
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Our empirical strategy is to use the individual-level CPS data to estimate a series of
models where Y, the outcome of interest, is a function of CLM and other determinants
of a decision. For individual i from state s in year t, outcome Y is:
Yist ¼ αCLMst þ βXist þ δs þ γt þ uist ð1Þ
where Y is one of the following probabilities for the entire sample: probability of (1)
being in a couple (either married or cohabiting), or (2) being married (versus unmar-
ried). In addition, for a sample of unmarried respondents, we estimate the probability
of (3) cohabiting (versus being single). A fourth outcome we analyze is the probability
of being divorced if ever-married. We estimate probit regressions for these three out-
comes. Furthermore, as a robustness test, we estimate multinomial logit regressions of
the log odds of being married or cohabiting relative to being single.
CLM, our variable of interest, indicates whether the state of residence recognizes
CLM in year t;
δs are state fixed effects to account for unobservable differences in economic, legal,
demographic and cultural environment that may affect individual choices, such as laws
regarding child custody and religiosity;
γt are time dummies to capture the time trend; and uijt are i.i.d. error terms.
The vector of controls X consists of:
a. Individual characteristics: a quadratic function of age, 4 dummies for educational
level, dummies for black, Hispanic, Asian and other ethnicity, two indicators for
metropolitan residence (central city and outside central city with non-metropolitan
with non-identifiable as a reference group), and log of personal non-labor income.
We chose not to include potentially endogenous total household income and
presence of children.
b. State characteristics: sex ratios calculated by respondents’ age and ethnicity to
reflect that most marriages are between people of the same ethnicity and that
marriage market conditions vary by ethnicity 13; unemployment rate to account for
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median household income to capture aggregate economic conditions and the cost
of living; share of college-educated, urban, Hispanic and black population to adjust
for differing marriage market conditions.
Some specifications also include indicators for the individual being in one of the
three transition states in the year immediately before the repeal of CLM, the year of the
repeal and in the years immediately following the repeal. The full list of controls in vec-
tor X can be found in the Additional file 1, where we show full estimates of equation
(1) for the probability of being in couple. We also experiment with including a dummy
variable for the state of New York before August 2010, when New York adopted no-
fault divorce, given that it was the last state to implement the divorce reform that other
states adopted before 1985. The coefficients on this variable are highly significant and
positive in most regressions, yet its presence does not change the results, and we don’t
include it in our final analyses. Results presented below include New Hampshire among
CLM states, even though it only offers CLM in the case of a partner’s death. Excluding
this state does not significantly alter our results. In some of our trial runs, we included in-
dicators for full-and part-time students. Students are significantly less likely to be in a
couple than non-students. Yet, we choose to report the results without these controls be-
cause they are potentially endogenous.
Standard errors are clustered by state/year to adjust for correlated standard errors
that are likely to arise due to common random effects at the state-year level. This is a
necessary step because the unit of observation is at the individual-level while the vari-
ation is at the state-level (see Moulton 1990). Identification of a CLM effect arises
through cross-state variation and variation over time as three states repealed CLM over
the period examined.
If the availability of CLM increases couple formation, we will observe positive coeffi-
cient α in the equation for the probability of being in a couple. If CLM increases the
odds of being married or cohabiting relative to staying single, the corresponding coeffi-
cients in the probit regressions for married and cohabiting will be positive. It is an em-
pirical issue whether there is evidence consistent with these predicted effects of CLM.
We estimate all models for the entire sample including all ethnicities. Ideally, we
would have liked to also present separate results for blacks, Hispanics, and whites given
that most marriages are within the same race, and there are reasons to believe that
marriage market conditions differ by ethnicity: means and standard deviations of the
dependent variables are significantly different for the white and black subsamples.
However, sample sizes of non-white groups are not sufficiently large for race-specific
difference-in-difference analyses. For example, there are fewer than 30 Hispanic men
and women in each of the transition states in most years, and there are virtually no
blacks in the relevant years in Idaho.
We present results separately for men and women. We expect that since monogamy
prevails overall, effects of CLM on couple formation of men and women will be similar.
However, to the extent that we analyze smaller samples subdivided by personal charac-
teristics, we expect gender differences in the effect of CLM due to different types of
matching between men and women with different characteristics. Overall, men aged
18-35 are less likely to be in a couple than women, and if they are, they are more likely
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that despite these differences, CLM affects couple formation among men and women
in similar ways it implies that our results are more robust.5 Results
Table 2 shows estimates of CLM effects on in-couple residence, not distinguishing be-
tween marriage and cohabitation. These probit marginal effects show how much the
probability of the outcome variable changes when the value of CLM changes from zero
to one, holding other variables at their means. We estimate three versions of equation
(1) for the full sample (Panel A) and separately for residents of the three transition
states (Panel B). The basic model and the model with state characteristics include state
and year fixed effects, whereas the third model includes state-specific time trends and
excludes 3 years (1996-99, 2005-07) after the repeal of the CLM law in the transition
states. These years are excluded in order to relax the assumption of quick adjustment
to changes in the law and quick couple formation.
All coefficients are negative, except for one, suggesting that CLM is associated with
lower rates of in-couple residence, as was predicted. The basic model’s coefficients for
all men and for women and men in the three transition states are statistically significant
at the 5% level. CLM effects for the full sample and the three-state subsample are nega-
tive and statistically significant in the last model with state-specific time trends that ex-
cludes the years after the law change. In most regressions, the coefficients for men are
larger in absolute value than they are for women, suggesting that relative to women,Table 2 CLM marginal effects in regressions of individual probability of being in couple
Basic model State characteristicsadded
State-specific time trends added,
3 years after each repeal removed
Women Men Women Men Women Men
A. Full sample
CLM -0.011 -0.028 -0.012 -0.025 -0.038 -0.065
[0.011] [0.012]** [0.012] [0.013]* [0.018]** [0.017]***
Observations 321917 292376 321917 292376 202309 183543
B. Only three transition states: Idaho (1996), Georgia (1997), Pennsylvania (2005)
CLM -0.03 -0.035 0.016 -0.002 -0.035 -0.061
[0.012]** [0.014]** [0.013] [0.017] [0.018]* [0.023]***
Observations 22176 19786 22176 19786 13708 12275
Other controls in the model
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State characteristics Yes yes yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows estimates of the probit marginal effects from equation (1) estimated at the mean. Each entry
comes from a separate regression. All regressions include individual demographic characteristics and state fixed effects.
Basic model and model with state characteristics include year fixed effects. The last model does not include year fixed
effects; instead it includes state-specific time trends, and it excludes 3 years after the repeal of the law in each transition
state (1996-99, 2005-07 are excluded).
Here and in all tables: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are clustered
by state and year, shown in brackets; individuals’ survey weights are used.
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CLM. In part, this could be because fewer men are in a couple by age 35, our sample’s
cutting point (see footnote 5).
Table 3 shows two more versions of equation (1), estimated for the full sample and a
sample of respondents from transition states. Here we keep all years in the data set but
include an indicator for one year immediately before the repeal of the law in transition
states, a dummy for year of abolition in those states, and four dummies for subsequent
years in transition states. The dummy for year before repeal is positive, suggesting that
couple formation increased in transition states several months before CLM was
repealed. This may be either because some couples or individuals who wanted to estab-
lish CLM rushed to do so or because the deterring feature of CLM–whatever it may
be–ceased to discourage couples from moving in together.
All coefficients for CLM in the year of repeal and in the three following years after
the repeal are negative. This could indicate the continuing effect of past availability of
CLM that possibly discouraged past couple formation. Alternatively, it could be a reac-
tion to excess couple formation the year before abolition. Again, the coefficients for
men tend to be larger in absolute value than those for women. Year four after the re-
peal shows a small increase in couple formation among women and no effect for men.
This could indicate more active couple formation among new couples encouraged by
the repeal of CLM. By year five after the repeal, we find no impact of CLM.
Our preferred specification appears in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3: it is estimated for
all states and includes state-specific time trends as well as dummies for CLM at differ-
ent points in time surrounding the date of the repeal in the transition states.
Table 4 shows estimates of CLM effects on the probability that (i) a respondent is
married as opposed to either cohabiting or being single (columns 1 and 2), (ii) an un-
married respondent is cohabitating (columns 3 and 4), and (iii) an ever-married re-
spondent is separated or divorced. The models are similar to the first model in Table 3.
The CLM coefficients in the marriage and cohabitation regressions are negative and
highly significant for men but only marginally significant for women. There is an in-
crease in cohabitation the year before and the year after CLM’s repeal, which suggests
that cohabiting couple formation responds to CLM changes faster than married co-
habitation. Marriage probability is not significantly affected by CLM the year before re-
peal, or in the year after repeal in the case of women. However the past availability of
CLM has a lingering effect on marriage 1-3 years after the repeal: there is a lower prob-
ability of being married in states that repealed CLM and had it two or three years be-
fore. This holds for both men and women.
Panel B indicates that effects of CLM on probability of being married are also nega-
tive when only considering the residents of three transition states. These small sample
estimates show limited impact of CLM on cohabitation, although regressions with
state-specific time trends (not presented here) show an increase in cohabitation the
year before repeal.
The last two columns in the same table show effects of CLM on the probability of be-
ing separated or divorced if ever married: Panel A for the full sample and Panel B for
respondents from transition states. For men in both panels, some of the CLM effects
on probability of being divorced are positive. Based on the whole sample, women from
transition states were less likely to be divorced four or five years after CLM’s repeal.
Table 3 Individual probability of being in couple as a function of CLM availability at different points in time
State and time fixed effects State-specific time trends Only 3 transition states Only 3 transition states, state-specific time trends
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
CLM -0.021 -0.051 -0.028 -0.059 -0.031 -0.033 -0.033 -0.069
[0.010]** [0.010]*** [0.020] [0.021]*** [0.020] [0.022] [0.021] [0.019]***
Year before repeal 0.028 0.035 0.028 0.032 0.004 0.037 0.027 0.033
[0.011]** [0.016]** [0.016]* [0.012]*** [0.017] [0.019]* [0.014]* [0.009]***
Year of the repeal 0.015 -0.037 0.015 -0.04 -0.052 -0.019 0.011 -0.045
[0.012] [0.014]*** [0.017] [0.018]** [0.018]*** [0.028] [0.016] [0.017]***
One year after repeal -0.031 -0.046 -0.032 -0.052 -0.096 -0.027 -0.033 -0.054
[0.011]*** [0.018]** [0.014]** [0.023]** [0.016]*** [0.023] [0.014]** [0.021]**
Two years after repeal -0.046 -0.055 -0.039 -0.045 -0.095 -0.002 -0.037 -0.044
[0.021]** [0.011]*** [0.017]** [0.015]*** [0.017]*** [0.027] [0.015]** [0.015]***
Three years after repeal 0.02 -0.005 0.028 0.003 -0.029 0.023 0.033 0.007
[0.008]** [0.027] [0.010]*** [0.030] [0.016]* [0.034] [0.010]*** [0.031]
Four years after repeal 0.022 0 0.023 0.001 -0.02 0.026 0.03 0.008
[0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.018] [0.016] [0.021] [0.017]* [0.020]
State characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 321917 292376 321917 292376 22175 19782 22175 19782
Notes: This table shows estimates of the probit marginal effects from equation (1) estimated at the mean. Each column comes from a separate regression. All regressions include individual demographic characteristics
and state fixed effects. Models 1 and 3 include state fixed effects. Models 2 and 4 include state-specific time trends.




















Table 4 CLM and probability of being married, cohabiting and divorced; probit marginal effects
Probability of being married among all
respondents
Probability of cohabiting among
unmarried
Probability of being divorced or separated among
ever-married
Women Men Women Men Women Men
1 2 3 4 5 6
A. Full sample
CLM -0.016 -0.033 -0.016 -0.026 0.011 0.026
[0.009]* [0.010]*** [0.009]* [0.007]*** [0.014] [0.018]
Year before repeal 0.004 0.001 0.035 0.044 -0.002 0.018
[0.011] [0.015] [0.009]*** [0.008]*** [0.016] [0.034]
Year of the repeal -0.004 -0.043 0.023 0.006 -0.012 0.045
[0.008] [0.011]*** [0.009]*** [0.006] [0.009] [0.019]**
One year after repeal -0.028 -0.033 -0.013 -0.016 -0.006 0.035
[0.008]*** [0.007]*** [0.014] [0.013] [0.010] [0.015]**
Two years after repeal -0.048 -0.042 -0.011 -0.02 0.018 0.044
[0.017]*** [0.010]*** [0.009] [0.007]*** [0.021] [0.029]
Three years after repeal 0.005 -0.014 0.015 0.006 -0.031 0
[0.014] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.017]* [0.010]
Four years after repeal 0.018 0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.052 -0.005
[0.011]* [0.015] [0.010] [0.005] [0.012]*** [0.009]
Observations 321917 292376 190655 186020 161687 123368
B. Only three transition states
CLM -0.046 -0.058 0.02 0.024 0.078 0.069
[0.018]*** [0.015]*** [0.013] [0.014]* [0.020]*** [0.028]**
Year before repeal 0.011 0.025 -0.014 0.014 0.006 -0.012




















Table 4 CLM and probability of being married, cohabiting and divorced; probit marginal effects (Continued)
Year of the repeal -0.044 -0.035 -0.013 0.018 0.057 0.05
[0.015]*** [0.019]* [0.011] [0.015] [0.023]** [0.029]*
One year after repeal -0.085 -0.04 -0.017 0.016 0.099 0.044
[0.015]*** [0.014]*** [0.009]* [0.014] [0.021]*** [0.029]
Two years after repeal -0.095 -0.028 -0.01 0.024 0.126 0.025
[0.017]*** [0.016]* [0.009] [0.019] [0.024]*** [0.038]
Three years after repeal -0.03 -0.001 -0.01 0.022 0.029 -0.011
[0.016]* [0.020] [0.012] [0.019] [0.020] [0.020]
Four years after repeal -0.004 0.019 -0.017 0.009 -0.003 0.009
[0.014] [0.013] [0.008]** [0.010] [0.016] [0.017]
Observations 22176 19786 12662 12218 11465 8758
Other controls: demographics, state
characteristics, year & state fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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with a higher probability of being divorced or separated, especially for women, suggest-
ing either that CLM facilitated couple formation among some individuals who were not
well-matched or that CLM discouraged remarriage/recoupling among some of the
women who were separated or divorced from a previous partner.5.1 Testing predictions 2 to 5
We test the predictions that were derived from the theoretical model in Section 2 for
the outcome “probability of being in couple”. From a policy standpoint, couple forma-
tion is a more interesting outcome than marriage or cohabitation. It has been shown
that children benefit from growing up with two parents, and children born to single
mothers typically grow up with less of a father’s presence in their lives than children
born to a cohabiting unwed couple (see Mincy and Oliver 2003). Relative to children
raised by a mother and a father, children raised by a single parent often achieve less in
terms of school performance (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994, McLanahan and Sigle-
Rushton 2004) and have higher rates of depression and crime participation (Hobcraft
1998, Sigle-Rushton et al. 2005). However, we also examine separate effects of CLM on
the likelihood of marriage (vs. cohabitation and single status) and the probability of co-
habitation (for unmarried respondents) for separate samples corresponding to our pre-
dictions. All regressions use our preferred model with state and year fixed effects and
indicators for the years before and after the repeal as in model 1 of Table 3.
In the first two rows and first two columns of Table 5, CLM marginal effects on in-
couple residence are estimated for subsamples of respondents split by education. Pre-
diction 2 implies that we should find larger effects of CLM on women’s probability of
being in-couple for women who are less educated. It can be seen from Table 5 that the
CLM coefficient is negative and significant in regressions for women without a college
degree, but it is zero for college-educated women. We also find negative effects of
CLM on cohabitation probability of these women without a college education.
However, we predicted that couple formation among men with a college degree
would respond more to CLM changes than among men without a degree (prediction
3). We find that all men have a lower probability of in-couple residence where CLM is
available. However, in accordance with the prediction, we find a stronger response to
CLM law changes for college educated men (the coefficient of CLM for college edu-
cated men is -.108) than for men without college (-.038). We conclude that there is evi-
dence for prediction 3 indicating that men who have a college degree have more to
loose from CLM in case of divorce.
CLM’s effect of men’s likelihood of being in a couple seems to originate from a nega-
tive effect of CLM on both the likelihood of marriage and the likelihood of cohabit-
ation. CLM’s effect on the likelihood of marriage of men with a college education is
much larger than its effect on marriage among men without college. However, effects
of CLM on cohabitation versus being unmarried and single are stronger for those with-
out a college education than on those who are college educated, reflecting the much
higher rates of marriage among the college-educated in the US (Fry 2014).
Prediction 4 stated that drops in women’s couple formation resulting from CLM
would be larger in low sex ratio states than in high sex ratio states. It can be seen from
Table 5 CLM marginal effects by subsample
In couple probit Married probit Cohabiting, among
unmarried probit
Women Men Women Men Women Men
No college -0.031 -0.038 -0.016 -0.018 -0.027 -0.024
[0.012]*** [0.010]*** [0.010] [0.011]* [0.009]*** [0.008]***
College educated -0.006 -0.108 -0.034 -0.103 0.036 -0.03
[0.025] [0.025]*** [0.025] [0.022]*** [0.028] [0.018]*
Low sex ratio -0.042 -0.084 -0.024 -0.046 -0.01 -0.031
[0.017]** [0.020]*** [0.012]** [0.012]*** [0.013] [0.012]***
High sex ratio -0.024 -0.029 -0.024 -0.025 -0.032 -0.021
[0.017] [0.018] [0.015] [0.020] [0.013]** [0.007]***
No children present -0.035 -0.041 -0.027 -0.017 -0.015 -0.023
[0.012]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.007]** [0.010] [0.007]***
Children present -0.015 -0.012 -0.007 -0.013 -0.018 -0.044
[0.016] [0.010] [0.019] [0.012] [0.019] [0.051]
Age 18-25 -0.011 -0.046 0.001 -0.015 -0.012 -0.031
[0.013] [0.009]*** [0.011] [0.007]** [0.010] [0.007]***
Age 26-35 -0.022 -0.038 -0.021 -0.039 -0.02 -0.01
[0.015] [0.016]** [0.014] [0.016]** [0.017] [0.020]
Notes: The table reports CLM marginal effects in regressions for probability of being in a couple. High sex ratio areas are
those with sex ratio >1 and low are sex ratio < =1.
The table shows full estimates of the first model from Table 3, our preferred specification with demographics, state
characteristics, year & state fixed effects, and six dummy variables for years before and after repeal of the law.
All pairs of coefficients estimated using two subsamples are statistically different from each other at less than 1% level.
Sample sizes in the first four columns vary between N = 55,908 for men with college degrees to N = 249,659 for women
with less than college education.
Sample sizes among unmarried adults in the last two columns vary between N = 10,450 for men with children to N = 159,883
for men with less than college education.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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both women and men when sex ratios are low, the only exception being that CLM does
not affect women’s likelihood of cohabitation when sex ratios are low. In contrast,
CLM effects on likelihood of in-couple residence and likelihood of marriage are zero
when sex ratios are high. This is consistent with what we argued: where sex ratios are
low, CLM potentially boosts the price of women’s WiHo, but not where sex ratios are
high. That we find this effect for both men and women makes sense given that monog-
amy prevails. We also find significant negative CLM effects on the probability of
cohabitation among the unmarried where sex ratios are high.
Prediction 5 was that CLM effects on couple formation are more likely to be found
for childless respondents than for those with children. It can be seen from rows 5 and 6
in Table 5 that when no children are present, CLM coefficients are negative for both
men and women and for all outcomes (except for the cohabitation vs. single regression
for women). When there are no children, less WiHo is likely to be performed, and CLM
as a form of minimum compensation for WiHo is expected to have more impact on
couple formation. In contrast, in all regressions of Table 5, the coefficient of CLM is in-
significant for both men and women with children. To the extent that presence of chil-
dren captures individuals with children from a previous relationship, this finding could
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riage market if they have children from previous relationships.
According to Prediction 6, CLM is more likely to have an effect on the likelihood of
being in couple in the case of the youngest respondents than in the case of those some-
what older. This may be gender-specific. The last two rows in Table 5 indicate that
younger men below age 26 are less likely to cohabit in CLM states, whereas men age
26-35 are less likely to get married. The impact of CLM does not vary by age for
women.5.2 Robustness checks
Our results suggest negative effects of CLM on couple formation. In order to ascertain
that these results are not spurious, we conduct three additional robustness checks.
Table 6 reports log odds of being in a married or cohabiting relationship relative to be-
ing single from the multinomial logit model over three outcomes: married, cohabiting,
and single. These equations include fixed time and state effects along with personal
demographic and state characteristics. The odds are negative for men and women. Liv-
ing in a CLM state reduced the log-odds of being married or cohabiting relative to
staying single while holding all other variables in the model constant. Cohabitation rises
the year before the repeal as evidenced by large and positive coefficients on the corre-
sponding dummy variable for both men and women. Cohabitation increases for women
during the repeal year. Marriages decline temporarily 1-3 years after the repeal with
men experiencing a larger decline in marriages compared to women.Table 6 Robustness check: multinomial logit log odds of cohabiting or being married
relative to being single
Women Men
Married Cohabiting Married Cohabiting
CLM -0.084 -0.188 -0.214 -0.33
[0.043]* [0.081]** [0.056]*** [0.085]***
Year before repeal 0.062 0.32 0.056 0.469
[0.053] [0.065]*** [0.077] [0.070]***
Year of the repeal 0.012 0.193 -0.25 0.063
[0.052] [0.076]** [0.072]*** [0.067]
One year after repeal -0.14 -0.158 -0.209 -0.231
[0.035]*** [0.147] [0.056]*** [0.189]
Two years after repeal -0.227 -0.103 -0.262 -0.207
[0.093]** [0.081] [0.060]*** [0.079]***
Three years after repeal 0.055 0.127 -0.044 0.065
[0.054] [0.098] [0.108] [0.144]
Four years after repeal 0.099 0.032 0.014 -0.027
[0.068] [0.098] [0.085] [0.056]
Demographics, state characteristics,
year & state fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 321917 321917 292376 292376
Notes: Multinomial logit model shows log odds of being married or cohabiting relative to being single; estimated separately for
men and women. Full set of controls included into the regressions.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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we used for identification often suffers from a serial correlation problem. Bertrand et al.
(2004) have shown that standard errors of DD estimators are often underestimated, and
thus the statistical significance of the coefficients is overestimated. We repeat their experi-
ment with ‘placebo laws’ in order to assess whether our results are reliable or could be due
to random coincidence. We remove the three actual transition states from the sample and
randomly assign any three states to be CLM states from 1995 until a random year between
1996 and 2006. We then estimate the impact of these fake laws on our outcomes of interest:
in couple residence, the probability of being married, and the probability of cohabiting. For
this experiment, we use our preferred model with state and year fixed effects and six dum-
mies for years before/after abolition. We repeat this procedure 100 times and record the
number of times the null hypothesis of no effect is rejected as well as the direction of
the estimated ‘effect’. We find that the non-existent laws are significant 22% and 17% of the
time in in-couple regressions for women and men, as well as correspondingly 20%, 21% in
marriage probability regressions, and 23% and 24% of the simulations in cohabitation re-
gressions. In all simulations, significantly positive and negative effects were equally likely,
for example, out of 17 significant effects of fake laws on in-couple residence among men, 8
are negative and 9 are positive. These non-rejection rates are higher than the 5% that can
be conventionally attributed to randomness. Thus, we conclude that this test is inconclu-
sive. In some simulations, the CLM dummy possibly picks up the average differences be-
tween existing CLM and non-CLM states or coincides with other changes that may have
occurred in randomly chosen states. We therefore design an additional test to check the ro-
bustness of our findings of negative effects of CLM on the probability of being married and
cohabiting.
According to Bertrand et al. (2004), one of the best ways to deal with serial correl-
ation in standard errors, if the problem is suspected, is to estimate a panel data model
using individual-level data aggregated by gender/year/state cells. We compute these es-
timates and record the results of this in Table 7. First, we regress the binary data on
whether the person is in a couple on personal characteristics. Then we calculate means
of residuals by year/state and regress the mean of residuals on CLM, state characteris-
tics, and state and year fixed effects. These are linear probabilities, not probits, yet we
once again obtain negative effects of CLM on the probability of being in a couple and
being married, negative coefficients for two years following the repeal, and larger over-
all effects for men than for women. None of the coefficients of interest in the cohabit-
ation equations are statistically significant.
5.3 Other coefficients, based on the Additional file 1
A higher sex ratio, i.e., a higher ratio of men per woman (using as two year age differ-
ence as explained in Section 4) strongly increases the odds that both men and women
are in couple. More specifically, a unit increase in sex ratio from 1 to 2 men per woman
increases women’s probability of being in a couple by 22.5%, according to the sex ratio
coefficient in the first column. In other words, a 10% increase in sex ratio (from 1 to
1.1) is expected to increase women’s probability of being in couple by 2.25%. A higher
unemployment rate in the last year causes a slight increase in the odds that the person
is in a couple. Men and women who live in higher income states (as measured by me-
dian state income) are more likely to have a spouse or a partner. The generosity of
Table 7 Robustness check: OLS estimates of linear probability models with data
aggregated by state/year
In couple Married Cohabiting
Women Men Women Men Women Men
1 2 3 4 5 6
CLM -0.017 -0.046 -0.022 -0.04 -0.002 -0.019
[0.016] [0.016]*** [0.015] [0.015]*** [0.016] [0.014]
Year before repeal 0.009 0.016 -0.008 -0.01 0.021 0.03
[0.022] [0.022] [0.020] [0.020] [0.022] [0.019]
Year of the repeal 0 -0.072 -0.015 -0.081 0.009 -0.013
[0.020] [0.020]*** [0.018] [0.018]*** [0.020] [0.017]
One year after repeal -0.03 -0.038 -0.036 -0.041 -0.005 -0.007
[0.020] [0.020]* [0.018]** [0.018]** [0.020] [0.017]
Two years after repeal -0.02 -0.027 -0.03 -0.022 0.002 -0.02
[0.020] [0.020] [0.018] [0.018] [0.020] [0.017]
Three years after repeal 0.002 -0.024 -0.004 -0.02 -0.005 -0.021
[0.020] [0.020] [0.018] [0.018] [0.020] [0.017]
Four years after repeal 0.011 0.001 0.007 0.001 -0.003 -0.008
[0.020] [0.020] [0.018] [0.018] [0.020] [0.017]
Demographics included in
the first stage, state characteristics,
year & state fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 867 867 867 867 867 867
Notes: To obtain these estimates, we first regress data on individual-level controls and collect residuals. Then we compute
average residuals by year and state, and regress them on year and state fixed effect.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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of black residents in the state is associated with a significant drop in the odds that the
respondent is in couple; a higher share of Hispanics in associated with a reduced prob-
ability that men are in couple. A higher share of educated residents increases men’s
odds of being in couple. Household formation has a concave age profile. Education has
a strong positive effect on the odds of being in a couple. Living in a metropolitan area,
especially in central city, reduces the odds of being in couple. Men and women of all
other ethnic groups are less likely to be in a relationship than their white counterparts.
Higher own unearned income is positively related to men’s probability of being in
couple but negatively related to that same probability for women.6 Discussion and conclusions
This paper examined whether the availability of Common-Law Marriage (CLM) helps
explain in-couple residence, marriage, and cohabitation among young men and women
in the US. A difference-in-difference analysis was performed given that during the
period examined, three states repealed CLM. Results using native CPS respondents
under age 36 reveal that CLM reduces in-couple residence and probability of marriage
among both women and men. Effects are larger for men than for women. We obtain
these results when considering all states and for a sample of the three states that
repealed CLM. Couple formation increases several months before the repeal and then
decreases for up to 3 years during the adjustment time following the repeal.
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setting a minimum price for women’s Work-In-Household (WiHo). Assuming trad-
itional gender roles, we derived gender-specific predictions regarding differential effects
of CLM by male and female education, sex ratio, parental status, and age. We predict
that college-educated men are more likely to experience reduced couple formation
under CLM than their counterparts without a college education, but that the opposite
is the case when comparing CLM’s effect on college educated-women with that on
women without a college education. We find that CLM has asymmetric effects on
couple formation and cohabitation for men and women in accordance with our
predictions.
Other predictions we find evidence for are that the couple formation effects of CLM
are stronger in states with low sex ratios (ratios of men to women) and in the case of
childless respondents.
Our basic finding implies that repeal of CLM encouraged couple formation.
Since overall couple formation rates have decreased in the US during this period,
it follows that other reasons have led to this drop in couple formation. One of
our recommendations aimed at encouraging couple formation is for the remaining
11 states to repeal CLM. This may be especially beneficial in areas from which
men migrate more than women, leaving populations with low sex ratios. We
found larger negative effects of CLM on in-couple residence of women without a
college education and on that of men with a college education. As a result, the re-
peal of CLM has led to larger increases in couple formation by low educated
women (relative to those with high education) and by high educated men (relative
to those with a low education).
In this analysis, we have assumed that the repeal of CLM is an exogeneous change. We
realize that changes in legislation are not spurious: factors that have led to increases in in-
couple residence rates may also have pushed states to repeal CLM laws. One of these fac-
tors may be social norms that are increasingly tolerant of cohabitation and accepting of an
egalitarian division of labor within the household. The more egalitarian a society’s gender
norms, the more households are formed (Sevilla-Sanz 2010). CLM goes against that trend:
by providing marriage-like protection to those who perform the household production
(typically women), it discourages men from cohabitating.
This has been an exploratory study. It is the first to suggest that couple formation,
marriage, and cohabitation are affected by Common Law Marriage legislation. More re-
search on these laws’ effects on couple formation is needed, including further econo-
metric evidence for the United States and other countries that underwent similar legal
changes. Endogenizing legal change would also be a welcome direction for future re-
search. It is hoped that new conceptual contributions about marriage, cohabitation,
couple formation, and CLM will be offered and that they will continue to be inspired
by Gary Becker’s economic theories of marriage.
Endnotes
1In 2002, 40% of first premarital cohabitations among women transitioned to mar-
riage within 3 years (Goodwin et al. 2010).
2Popular sites with information on CLM:
http://video.about.com/marriage/How-to-Qualify-for-a-Common-Law-Marriage.htm;
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Common Law Marriage Handbook for government employees who handle claims:
http://www.dol.gov/owcp/energy/regs/compliance/PolicyandProcedures/CommonLaw_
Marriage.pdf.
3Travis county in Texas offers CLM couples to fill out a Vital Statistics form, which
suggests that some CLMs are recorded among New Marriages: http://www.co.travis.tx.
us/dro/common_law.asp.
4Only one of Becker’s Demand and Supply models of marriage appears in Becker’s
(1981) Treatise on the Family.
5The percentage of men ever married by age 34 was 73.8% in 1990 and 63% in 2010.
For women, these percentages were 81.8% and 72.8% (UN world marriage data at
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WMD2012/MainFrame.html) for 1990.
For the US in 2010, the percent ever married was computed using the US census table
creator at http://www.census.gov/cps/data/cpstablecreator.html.
6WiHo may also benefit the self. More on this Beckerian theory of marriage can be
found in Grossbard (2015).
7In this model, men and women remain individual decision-makers after marriage. No
gain from marriage is calculated as is the case in Becker’s theory of marriage. The larger
the transfer of goods or money from the spouse employing WiHo to the WiHo-worker,
the larger share of the gain from marriage obtained by the WiHo-worker.
8Spouses could also pay WiHo-workers with love, but the compensation for WiHo is
expected to mostly contain a material component.
9Markets for WiHo are similar to the markets for wives or husbands found, e.g., in
Becker (1973) and Choo and Siow (2006).
10Men may also supply WiHo to their wife, especially if they earn less than she does.
11Also see Brien and Sheran (2003). A possible reason why educated women are more
in demand in WiHo markets and benefit from a higher equilibrium y than women
without a college education is that they are more productive in WiHo. For example,
they may be more productive at educating shared children and better household man-
agers. All women with a higher y (including college educated women) have more bar-
gaining power within their relationships and are less likely to be affected by CLM laws.
12https://cps.ipums.org/cps/.
13Sex ratios are computed by dividing the number of men in age groups 20-24,
25-29, 30-34, 35-39 by the number of women two years younger (see Grossbard 2015,
Chapter 6).
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